Mass Jury Trials in Mass Tort Cases: Some Preliminary Issues by Weber, Mark C.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 48 
Issue 2 Winter 1998: Symposium - The 
American Civil Jury: Illusion and Reality 
Article 16 
Mass Jury Trials in Mass Tort Cases: Some Preliminary Issues 
Mark C. Weber 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Mark C. Weber, Mass Jury Trials in Mass Tort Cases: Some Preliminary Issues, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 463 
(1998) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol48/iss2/16 
This Commentaries is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
MASS JURY TRIALS IN MASS TORT CASES:
SOME PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Mark C. Weber*
Mass tort proceedings1 are a major subject of the current debates in
civil procedure,2 and mass tort trials are one of the thorniest topics
within those debates. This year's Clifford Symposium focuses on the
role of the civil jury in contemporary American litigation, so it is im-
portant to consider the role of the jury in large-scale tort trials. This
contribution seeks to frame that issue by raising several preliminary
questions. What mass tort trials have been conducted? Are mass tri-
als of mass torts desirable, apart from considerations directly related
to juries? Do courts even have the legal authority to order mass trials
in tort cases? Part I of this Article discusses the current record of
mass trials in mass torts.3 Part II takes up the legal and policy issues
involved in framing mass trials, discussing in subpart A the advisabil-
ity of holding the proceedings and in subpart B their legal permissibil-
ity.4 The Article concludes with some assessments of whether, when,
and where mass tort trials should take place.
I. A LOOK AT THE LANDSCAPE
The study of mass tort cases has largely been the study of consoli-
dated pretrial proceedings. 5 Mass trials of mass torts have remained
* Professor of Law, DePaul University, B.A. 1975, Columbia; J.D. 1978, Yale. Thanks to
Victoria Napolitano for her research assistance.
1. Mass tort cases are those arising out of a single-incident disaster with many injuries and
suits for tort liability, as well as dispersed product injuries, which are similar injuries or illnesses
alleged to be caused by a defective product, giving rise to many tort claims. See generally 3
HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 17.06 (3d ed. 1992) (defining various
forms of complex litigation).
2. For a recent collection of articles on the topic, see Symposium on Mass Torts, 31 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 353 (1998).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum, 1995 BYU L.
REV. 879; Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Proce-
dure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1986); Diana E. Murphy, Unified and Consolidated Complaints
in Multidistrict Litigation, 132 F.R.D. 597 (1990); William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federal-
ism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of
Large-Scale Litigation Pending in State and Federal Courts, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1529 (1995); Mark C.
Weber, Managing Complex Litigation in the Illinois Courts, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 959 (1996).
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rare, and their study even rarer.6 Of course, compared to other dispo-
sitions of civil litigation, a trial is an infrequent event. 7 Those complex
tort cases that do go to trial, however, usually go to single-plaintiff or
small-group trials.
The best-established pattern is with asbestos cases in the state
courts.8 There, the typical practice is to have coordinated or consoli-
dated proceedings for preliminary motion practice and discovery, fol-
lowed by individual or small-group jury trials for plaintiffs whose cases
have not been settled or dismissed out.9 The cases that are tried in
groups are those with common defendants and similar allegations con-
cerning exposure. 10 In locales that have large numbers of cases, state
court systems have frequently appointed a single judge to coordinate
the pretrial proceedings; that person assigns out a portion of the cases
to other judges for trial as docket space permits.1
6. One study is Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbes-
tos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475 (1991). Also of significance are Michael
J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and
Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992) and Roger H. Transgrud, Mass
Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69. Articles on the use of juries in
complex cases, but not specifically in mass torts, include: Maxwell M. Blecher & Howard F.
Daniels, In Defense of Juries in Complex Antitrust Litigation, 1 REV. LITIG. 47 (1980); Commit-
tee on Fed. Courts of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Improving Jury Comprehension in Complex Civil
Litigation, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 549 (1988); Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex
Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68 (1981); William W. Schwarzer, Re-
forming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575 (1990); Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for
Complex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 49 (1997).
7. The percentage of civil cases that go to trial is in the single digits. See Michael J. Saks, Do
We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1212-15 (1992) (analyzing federal and state statistics regarding trial and
settlement rates).
8. Comprehensive studies of asbestos litigation include: PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MIS-
CONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985) and Charles D. Maguire, Jr. et al., Special
Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36
VAND. L. REV. 573 (1983). Shorter treatments include: STATE JUDGES ASBESTOS LITIG. COMM.,
MEGATORTS: THE LESSONS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1992) and THOMAS E. WILLGING, ASBES-
TOS CASE MANAGEMENT: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES (1985).
9. See, e.g., In re All Asbestos Litig. Filed in Madison County (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 17, 1995)
(standing case management order for all asbestos personal injury cases).
10. See id. at 15 (providing for grouping of cases for trial based on work site, craft, trade or
union, and disease).
11. See id. at 14; see also WILLGING, supra note 8, at 31-32 (noting that group trials of five to
ten asbestos cases are common in federal courts). See generally ALEXANDER B. AIKMAN, MAN-
AGING MASS TORT CASES: A RESOURCE BOOK FOR STATE TRIAL COURT JUDGES 106-30 (1995)
(discussing trial procedures in mass tort cases). Dispersed product injury cases cluster in particu-
lar districts, swamping the dockets in those locations. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in
Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil Justice's Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 495-
96 (1987) (noting that occupational exposure and other factors cause geographic concentration
of filings). Appointing a single judge to manage the cases is a common response to the backlog
that develops. See Weber, supra note 5, at 968.
MASS JURY TRIALS
Larger-scale mass tort trials are truly rare events, and quickly be-
come the stuff of legal folklore.12 One proceeding, the Baltimore as-
bestos litigation,13 merits description here because the combined trial
used in that case contrasts with the coordinated-pretrial-separate-trial
approach to asbestos cases that prevails in other jurisdictions. 14
In the Baltimore litigation, actions for asbestos exposure that had
been filed in the Maryland courts were consolidated in the Baltimore
Circuit Court.' 5 The transferee court initially devised a plan to coor-
dinate pretrial proceedings and try those cases that had not settled or
been dismissed in groups of ten.' 6 Then, realizing that annual new
filings were ten times the number of cases that could be tried annually,
the court modified the plan so that there would be a four-phase com-
bined trial embracing the claims of 8,555 plaintiffs and, ultimately, six
defendants.' 7
In phase one, all defendants were tried as to the issues plaintiffs had
in common against them.' 8 The jury determined that as to specific
products of each defendant (and one of two additional cross-claim de-
fendants) that the defendants were negligent and strictly liable.19 In
phase two, the jury decided six representative plaintiffs' cases as to all
12. A few of the mass tort trials that have occurred are: In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290
(6th Cir. 1988) (affirming jury finding of no causation in limited-issues trial of 1,180 claims re-
garding drug said to cause birth defects); In re Salmonella Litig., 556 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (affirming jury verdict denying punitive damages in class action over contaminated milk
products); County of DuPage v. Helmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., No. CV 92 L 1779 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. May 25, 1993) (order setting trial date) (involving mass trial over respiratory illnesses alleg-
edly caused by defective ventilation system in building); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., No. CV
77-79 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 7, 1980) (entering judgment on verdict for defendants on causation issue in
trial of 200 plaintiffs against 23 defendants over allegedly defective wiring said to cause restau-
rant fire), rev'd, 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982) (reversing verdict on ground of jury misconduct).
13. See AC & S, Inc. v. Godwin, 642 A.2d 192 (Md. 1994) (concerning exposure to asbestos),
modified on reconsideration, 667 A.2d 116 (Md. 1995); see also AC & S, Inc. v. Abate, 710 A.2d
944 (Md. App. 1998) (concerning exposure to asbestos products).
14. Also providing a useful contrast is the Jenkins-Cimino-Raymark asbestos litigation, Jen-
kins v. Raymark, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985), affd sub nom. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.
1986) (interlocutory appeal approving plan to try asbestos cases of 2,298 plaintiffs against five
defendants on limited issues); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990)
(adopting procedure of averaging representative jury verdicts to determine damages), but it will
not be described here because of the ample commentary available elsewhere. See, e.g., Mullenix,
supra note 6. Contrasting with both individual trial litigation and mass trial litigation in asbestos
cases is class action or other large-scale settlement of the claims. On that topic, see Mark C.
Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIo ST. L.J. (forthcoming 1999) (collecting other commentary).
15. Godwin, 667 A.2d at 119.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 120.
18. Id. at 120-21.
19. Id.
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remaining issues.20 The three plaintiffs selected by plaintiffs' counsel
received verdicts, and the three selected by defendants' counsel lost,
with the jury finding that they did not have asbestos-related disease.2 1
The third and fourth phases of the trial addressed punitive damages
for the four defendants whose cases had not already settled or been
dismissed with regard to the issue, with phase three establishing liabil-
ity for each of them, and phase four establishing a multiplier amount
for compensatory damages in order to determine punitive damages
awarded against each of the defendants. 22
In deciding the defendants' appeal, the highest court in Maryland
ruled that the consolidation of the trial as to the issues regarding the
state of the art was proper in light of the common nature of the deter-
mination.2 3 At the same time, it reversed one of the individual plain-
tiff determinations 24 and ruled that the evidence did not support the
punitive damages determination. 25
The trial of the common issues in one proceeding plainly prevented
the duplication that would have occurred in separate, small-group tri-
als, thus saving significant time and expense while bringing the matter
closer to conclusion for more than 8,500 plaintiffs. It is possible that
some of the same savings might have been realized by using issue pre-
clusion doctrines against defendants under a separate-trial procedure,
but few courts have applied offensive issue preclusion in asbestos
cases.26 It may well have induced the settlements by the defendants
who left the litigation before the trial. To what degree the procedure
has hastened the ultimate resolution of the 8,449 cases that were not
tried as to all issues remains unclear. The verdict on the common is-
sues and the representative cases will affect settlement dynamics, as
will the appellate resolution of the punitive damages issue, but it is
hard to determine whether the settlement effects would be greater, or
in other respects different, than would be those of the first cases going
to verdict had the original group-trial plan been pursued. Obviously,
had the liability phase of the trial gone against the plaintiffs, econo-
20. Id. at 121.
21. Godwin, 667 A.2d at 121.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 150.
24. Id. at 127.
25. Id. at 144.
26. Courts have stressed the disuniformity of results in previous cases in rejecting application
of preclusion. For a discussion of this topic, see Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive
Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70
IOWA L. REv. 141, 147-52, 172-78 (1984).
[Vol. 48:463
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mies would have been realized, though the plaintiffs would have
claimed that the cost-saving came at the expense of justice.
11. LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN MASS TRIALS
The two questions about mass jury trials that I would like to high-
light are the general desirability of holding a large-scale trial proceed-
ing, and the authority of the courts to put cases in a posture where the
question of desirability can even be raised.
A. Desirability of Consolidated Jury Trials
A long list of issues confronts anyone contemplating the desirability
of conducting a mass trial in a mass tort. Apart from concerns specifi-
cally having to do with jury competence and rights to trial by jury, the
issues include efficiency, consistency, participation, risks of legal error,
settlement pressure, issue separation, and choice of law.
1. Efficiency Considerations
The most obvious benefit from a mass trial is judicial economy: wit-
nesses need be heard only once; the judges and attorneys do not have
to conduct an endless succession of similar contests; and a single ap-
peal can determine any disputed matters of controlling law. As Pro-
fessor Zechariah Chafee commented half a century ago, "In matters
of justice ... the benefactor is he who makes one lawsuit grow where
two grew before. ' 27
Nevertheless, judicial economy as such may be overrated as a bene-
fit of mass trial proceedings. Even the most carefully constructed trial
may become bogged down in the testimony of hundreds of individu-
als, their families, and treating physicians, concerning exposure or
damages.28 Juries may or may not be good judges of scientific mat-
ters, but even with documentary materials and visual aids, they may
have trouble keeping straight the specifics regarding large numbers of
plaintiffs. For this reason and others, judges conducting mass trials
usually do not include all issues. Matters of individual exposure or
damages are typically left for future proceedings, in which judicial ad-
juncts may be used.2 9 This solution, however, generates its own
problems, for the separation of issues into distinct proceedings may
affect the outcome of the case. 30 Small-group trials may be the prefer-
27. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EOuiT 149 (1950).
28. See Transgrud, supra note 6, at 76.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 12-26 (discussing mass trials).
30. See infra text accompanying note 50.
1998]
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able option, perhaps using videotape testimony and similar devices to
achieve some economies.
An overriding efficiency consideration, however, at least to the
plaintiffs, is the problem of waiting for docket space for individual
trials. Because mass tort cases cluster in particular locations,31 con-
gestion diminishes the likelihood of any particular plaintiff's case go-
ing to trial in a reasonable time. Defendants can exploit the backlog
by refusing to settle except on terms highly favorable to them.32 A
single proceeding brings everyone to the beginning of the line. 33 Even
if the trial does not dispose of all issues, a decision in plaintiffs' favor
makes the settlement dynamics far more favorable for the claimants.
Of course, this delay-elimination benefit will not apply to all plain-
tiffs. Those already at the head of the line in their particular locations
usually prefer to go ahead with their own proceedings. 34 But for the
larger number of victims of a mass tort, a mass trial might be the best
way to achieve compensation in their lifetimes. 35
2. Consistency Advantages
Consolidation leads to similar results in similar cases. The same de-
cision maker can ensure that the same legal principles and factual con-
clusions are applied across the board to all persons involved in the
case.36 Having consistent results in like cases is a laudable goal, and
contributes to both the real and the perceived fairness of the judicial
system.
Nevertheless, justice is furthered only when the decision of the
court in the consolidated trial proceeding is consistently correct; the
system should prefer one wrong decision and one right decision to two
identical decisions that are consistently wrong on the facts or the
law. 37 Foolish consistency must be avoided, and it is foolish indeed to
elevate consistency of results over justice in particular cases.
31. See Hensler, supra note 11, at 495-96.
32. See HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT 128 (2d ed. 1978) (explaining effect of
delay in decreasing size of settlements).
33. See Weber, supra note 14 (discussing similar effects from class certification).
34. If an opt-out class action is used to consolidate the cases, these individuals may choose to
exit in order to make use of their advantageous position in their particular venues.
35. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 666 (E.D. Tex. 1990) ("It is apparent
from the effort ... to try 160 [asbestos] cases [to date] that unless ... some ... procedure that
permits damages to be adjudicated in the aggregate is approved, these cases cannot be tried.").
36. See Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and Practical
Advantages of the State Forum Over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 215, 253-54 (1994).
37. See id. at 254 n.209.
[Vol. 48:463
MASS JURY TRIALS
Even apart from the risk of compounding error, inconsistency may
be necessary to preserve important policy interests of the states. For
example, many states have passed tort reform statutes that limit or
deny traditional elements of recovery in tort cases.38 In a given dis-
persed-injury case, such a law may apply only to the victims who re-
side in or were injured in one of those states. The only way to further
the state's policy is to limit or deny the recovery pursuant to the stat-
ute, even if that result makes the plaintiffs to whom the law applies
worse off than plaintiffs from other places.39 Nevertheless, if the trial
court applies different law depending on the origin of the victim or
geographic location of the injury, the efficiency of trial consolidation
will be reduced, perhaps to the vanishing point, as the finder of fact
hears different evidence made relevant to various parties by differing
statutes, and tries to sort out which plaintiffs are entitled to what.40
3. Participation Issues
Professor Roger Transgrud's ground-breaking article stressed the
loss of individual control that comes with mass trial proceedings, 41 and
that concern has generated the greatest commentary with regard to
consolidated tort proceedings, particularly trials.42 The primary argu-
ment in response has not been to deny the likelihood of loss of indi-
vidual control, even when the consolidation is nominally joinder of
individual cases, rather than a class action proceeding. Instead, pro-
ponents of consolidation have argued that the actual plaintiffs-the
clients, not the attorneys-have very little control or opportunity for
participation even in individual, unconsolidated proceedings.43
Hence, there is less to lose from consolidation than some might think.
Proponents of consolidation concede that opportunities for client par-
38. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 710-15 (5th
ed. 1992) (collecting and analyzing statutes).
39. See Robert A. Sedler & Aaron Twerski, State Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases: A Re-
sponse To "A View From The Legislature," 73 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 635 (1990).
40. See id. at 628.
41. Transgrud, supra note 6, at 69, 74-76, 82-84. Other concerns noted include distortion of
the relationship of client and attorney, risks of coercive settlement, and distortions of underlying
law. Id. at 82-85.
42. Professor Resnik's work on this subject is particularly illuminating, and also discusses re-
lated issues. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1991, at 5; Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); Judith Res-
nik, Procedural Innovations, Sloshing Over, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1995). Other important
sources include Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion over Competing Com-
plex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273 (1991) and Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposi-
tion of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV. LrriG. 231 (1991).
43. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REV. 89, 92-100.
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ticipation might be enhanced in individual litigation, but the same op-
portunities might be afforded in consolidated trial proceedings as well,
perhaps through the use of judicial adjuncts. 44
4. Risks of Legal Error
When the number and complexity of issues in a trial rises, so does
the risk of legal error. No judge knows everything, and clever advo-
cates sometimes try to invite error when they feel that the trial results
are going to go against them. A case with hundreds of evidentiary
rulings and dozens of crucial instructions is all but certain to have a
judicial mistake somewhere. If the mistake leads to an appellate or-
der for a new trial, there will be massive duplication of litigation costs
for all the parties, wiping out many of the gains from consolidating the
trial in the first place. 45
A concomitant risk is that an appellate court seeking to avoid the
imposition of those costs might distort legal principles, or at least bend
the harmless error doctrine, to uphold a verdict. This desire to pre-
vent expensive trial proceedings may have motivated the Second Cir-
cuit in affirming Judge Weinstein's approval of settlement in the Agent
Orange litigation.46 The costs, and even the logistics, of any trial must
have appeared forbidding. The court of appeals approved a number
of dubious propositions to avoid ordering the district court to conduct
a trial, notably the prediction that all of the district courts in which the
cases were filed would have applied the choice-of-law principles of
their states to decide that a "national consensus" tort law should apply
to the issues of the case. 47
There have not been enough mass trials to determine whether ver-
dicts will be reversal-prone or reversal-proof. If mass trials become
prevalent, both effects will probably appear, depending on the case
and the predilections of the appellate court. In some cases, it will be
impossible for the trial judge to get it right, and in others, it will be
impossible to get it wrong. Justice will suffer in both situations.
5. Settlement Pressure
The flip side of solving the problem of trial delay is that a consoli-
dated proceeding will actually reach a result sooner, rather than later,
44. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.
659, 693-94 (1989).
45. See id. at 694 (discussing problem of magnification of error in consolidated proceeding).
46. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987).
47. Id. at 182-83 (upholding application of national consensus tort law to district court's evalu-
ation of strength of case for purposes of approval of class action settlement).
[Vol. 48:463
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and any negative effects of the result on the defendant will be felt
severely and all at once.48 Fear of a bet-the-company case may induce
the defendant to settle on terms it would not otherwise contemplate.
This outcome effect is well recognized in class action cases.49
There is no way to avoid some effect on settlement in making the
consolidation decision, for if consolidated treatment is denied, many
cases do not go to trial in a reasonable time, forcing the plaintiffs to
settle cheap. Moreover, even the loss of cost-sharing from denial of
group treatment makes individual expenses rise, eliminating cases at
the margin as they become uneconomical. Neither individual nor con-
solidated treatment has a superior claim as the baseline.
6. Issue Separation Considerations
With the desire to handle all aspects of a case in a single proceeding
comes the desire to simplify the case so that it can actually be decided.
The issues that all the mass tort cases likely have in common are gen-
eral causation, facts pertaining to the defendant's conduct and knowl-
edge, and similar matters. Courts have tried these issues separately,
leaving individual facts of exposure, specific causation, and damage to
later, probably non-consolidated proceedings. The judges reason,
quite correctly, that a decision for the plaintiffs on the common issues
will induce the defendant to settle most of the individual claims, while
a decision for defendant will end the case, except for the inevitable
appeals.
The picture is neither as simple nor as rosy as this analysis suggests,
however. Plaintiffs typically resist separation of liability issues from
damage issues, arguing that trying liability by itself creates an unrealis-
tic, sterile setting that makes it easier for judges and juries to side with
defendants. For their part, defendants frequently argue that issue sep-
aration enhances the accuracy of trial results by preventing juries from
hearing evidence of horrible sickness or injury and awarding some-
thing to the plaintiffs, irrespective of the defendant's true
responsibility.
Where one stands on the issue depends on where one sits at the
trial. There is little doubt, however, that separation of liability and
48. Consolidation alone, without the prospect of a joint trial, may induce the same effect,
however. Denial of the defendant's motion for summary judgment in a case consolidated only
for pretrial proceedings creates the prospect of many dispersed trials, a similar degree of liabil-
ity, and just as much pressure on the defendant to settle.
49. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting writ of
mandamus to overturn class action certification in product liability case, stating that class action
procedure may create irresistible pressure to settle).
1998]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
damages does have effects on the outcome of tort cases.50 For this
reason, it seems particularly inappropriate to leave the decision on
bifurcation of the trial to the trial judge's discretion, as Federal Rule
4251 is generally held to do.5 2 Judges should not be making random,
near-irreversible, low-visibility decisions about matters affecting com-
pensation of vast numbers of seriously injured individuals and stagger-
ing liabilities for defendants. The relevant jurisdiction should have a
rule about when to separate issues and when not to do so.
That there should be a rule is clearer than what the rule ought to be.
In a thoughtful exposition, Professor James Henderson and his co-au-
thors have argued that issue separation should take place only in a
bet-the-industry case, such as a class action concerning an allegedly
defective drug said to have caused severe injury to thousands of indi-
viduals.5 3 Others disagree, arguing either against or in favor of bifur-
cation in various classes of cases.54 One mechanism for hedging the
bets on the issue is to conduct a trial as to some issues with regard to
the entire group of plaintiffs, combining that proceeding with a ple-
nary trial for several, apparently typical plaintiffs.55 The representa-
tive plaintiffs' cases may help bring home to the jury the human
dimension of the case.
7. Choice of Law Problems
At one time, tort law in the United States may have been converg-
ing towards a set of common principles, with differences among states
falling into predictable categories, such as automobile guest statutes
and the existence of intrafamily immunities. As noted above, how-
ever, the wave of tort reform legislation in the 1980s and 1990s has
shattered any emerging tort law consensus. Even if the approach
50. See Weber, supra note 5, at 978 nn.128-30 (citing collections of studies).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
52. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Paris Air Crash of Mar.
3, 1974, 69 F.R.D. 310, 318-20 (C.D. Cal. 1975). For a compact but authoritative discussion of
this topic, see 8 STEPHAN LANDSMAN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 42.20-.24 (3d ed. 1998).
53. See James A. Henderson, Jr. et al., Optimal Issue Separation in Modern Products Liability
Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1653, 1694-96 (1995).
54. See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 44, at 691-92.
55. Cf. AC & S, Inc. v. Godwin, 667 A.2d 116 (Md. 1995) (affirming in part verdicts in case
adopting common-issues, then representative-plaintiff trial procedure). The AC & S case, how-
ever, divided the common-issue trial and the representative-plaintiff trial into distinct phases,
with separate jury verdicts at the end of each phase, thus undercutting the value of the procedure
to eliminate the problem of a sterile trial setting for the determination of liability. See supra text
accompanying notes 15-25 (describing Baltimore asbestos litigation).
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taken by various tort law initiatives is misguided,56 state experimenta-
tion with tort law has its merits. The states are indeed serving as labo-
ratories of democracy,57 and a vigorous policy debate has emerged on
important tort law issues, with advocates citing the experience of the
various states.58 Moreover, the diverse tort law that now exists in the
United States accurately reflects regional differences in culture and
group preferences. For example, Vermonters are more comfortable
with a duty to rescue than are New Yorkers.5 9 Tort law is an impor-
tant means of expressing the values of the citizens of both those states.
Letting many tort law flowers bloom produces real difficulties for
mass trials, however, for the applicable law may well differ signifi-
cantly in the various consolidated cases. As noted above, efficiency
diminishes when the judge needs to admit or to bar the same items of
evidence based on relevance to differing rules of law. 60 Devising a
scorecard of applicable jury instructions for each plaintiff's case is a
challenging task.
Nevertheless, the benefits may outweigh the drawbacks in some in-
stances, and there may be mechanisms to solve some of the worst
problems. One solution is to have several consolidated trials based on
which law applies to which parties.61 Some duplication of evidence
and risk of inconsistency would be present, but inconsistency based on
the differing law would, of course, be appropriate. Another approach
draws from criminal procedure. In criminal cases, courts have had
several juries sit in the same courtroom, each assigned to the case
against a particular defendant. All juries hear the common evidence
and instructions pertaining to all the defendants, but each leaves the
room when particular evidence or instructions pertain only to a de-
fendant other than the defendant to which the jury is assigned.62 A
similar procedure might be used in a mass tort trial with regard to
56. See, e.g., Richard Michaels, Joint Liability: Should It Be Reformed or Abolished?-The
Illinois Experience, 27 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 867 (1996) (criticizing abolition of joint and several
liability in Illinois tort reform statute).
57. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
58. See Robert Pear, Clinton May Seek Lid on Doctor Fees and Liability Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1993, at Al (discussing use of California experience in restricting malpractice liability by
proponents and opponents of similar federal action).
59. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973) (imposing duty to rescue). See generally Robert
Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet Responsibilities, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 649, 660 (1995) (discussing duty to rescue imposed by some states).
60. See supra text accompanying note 40.
61. I have proposed that these actions should take place in interested forum states with differ-
ing law, and should embrace those actions bound by the particular laws. See Weber, supra note
36, at 265.
62. See People v. Johnson, 594 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1992) (upholding procedure against Sixth
Amendment challenge).
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various groupings of plaintiffs and defendants whose cases will be gov-
erned by different laws.
Some authorities have proposed a general federal law of tort, so
that there is a single law to be applied to all mass tort proceedings.63
In my view, these proposals are ill-advised. It is letting a very small
tail wag a very large dog to establish a new tort law merely to facilitate
mass trials, which may themselves be a dubious advantage. Moreover,
divergent state tort law is a good thing, a valid expression of local
values and state regulatory interests.64 Principles of federalism should
protect the states' ability to develop and enforce their own laws of
tort, using their own court systems and legislatures.65
All these considerations leave the desirability of large-scale trial
consolidation uncertain. The balance may well shift from case to case,
as concerns over trial delay may be overriding in some situations, and
manageability, fairness, and other considerations less pressing. The
mix may work out differently in other cases.
B. Authority of Courts to Consolidate for Trial
To reach the point of considering the desirability of consolidated
proceedings, courts need the authority to put the case into a consoli-
dated form. Recent caselaw developments cast some doubt on the
likelihood of courts having the authority. These developments in-
clude, at the federal level, the recent decisions Lexecon, Inc. v. Mil-
berg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach66 and Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor.67 At the state level, they include the persistence of territo-
rial limits on state court jurisdiction. None of the developments en-
tirely eliminates the possibility of large-scale trial consolidations,
however.
1. Lexecon
In the Lexecon case, the Supreme Court held that a court that re-
ceives cases transferred to it for consolidated pretrial proceedings pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) lacks the power to assign the
63. See Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1077-79; Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disas-
ters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429, 443-45 (1986); Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More
Darkness on the Subject, Or a New Role for Federal Common Law?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 167
(1985); see also Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 842 (1989)
(arguing the legitimacy of broad federal common law).
64. See Weber, supra note 36, at 237-45.
65. See id. For a response, see Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation and the Dilemma of
Federalization, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 755 (1995).
66. 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
67. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
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consolidated proceeding to itself for trial. 68 The Court noted that the
statute provides explicitly that at the conclusion of pretrial proceed-
ings, the actions are to be remanded to the districts from which they
were transferred. 69 The decision would appear to permit consolida-
tions of federal cases only within the districts in which they were filed,
but the operation of a different statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), opens the
door somewhat wider.
Under section 1404(a), a federal court may transfer a case to an-
other district for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, as long
as the transferee court is one where the action might have been filed.70
Nevertheless, since the action must be able to have been brought in
the transferee district, federal limits on venue 71 and state limits on
territorial jurisdiction incorporated in Federal Rule 472 greatly restrict
the freedom to transfer. Moreover, under section 1407(a), the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation makes the decision to transfer; under
section 1404(a), the matter is up to every federal judge in whose court
each action was originally filed. The legal limits and the necessity of
individual decisions make global transfer and consolidation of a mass
tort case to a single federal forum highly unlikely. Legislative change
might alter this state of affairs, but Congress has been unenthusiastic
about past federal transfer and consolidation proposals.73
2. Amchem
In Amchem, the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of a class ac-
tion settlement in a mass asbestos case, ruling that the common issues
did not predominate, 74 and that the case did not meet standards for
representative adequacy.75 The Court also questioned whether it was
possible to give effective notice to the class, which consisted of all per-
sons exposed to the defendants' asbestos who had not yet filed suit,
irrespective of whether the persons had manifested injury or other
harm, and all persons with derivative claims. 76
68. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 964.
69. Id. at 962.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1997).
71. Id. § 1391 (general federal venue provisions).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k).
73. See Weber, supra note 36, at 258 (giving history of proposals).
74. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2249-50 (1997).
75. Id. at 2250-51.
76. Id. at 2252.
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Authorities disagree on the effect Amchem will have on class action
practice.77 Though the Court approved the idea that a settled class
action is exempt from the standards of manageability that one going
to trial must satisfy,78 it established that tort claimants in a class action
should be divided into subclasses, with separate representatives, based
on common factual characteristics and interests. Those who are cur-
rently ill must be in a separate group from those who have yet to man-
ifest disease, and perhaps further subclassing is required based on the
nature of the injury and the law that governs the recovery. 79
In light of Lexecon, a class action may be the only viable means to
consolidate a mass tort in a single federal forum for a mass trial. The
predominance and representative adequacy holdings of Amchem do
not eliminate the viability of that option; they merely require that
clear subclasses participate in the trial, each with their own represen-
tative. The Court's comments about notice, however, raise the ques-
tion whether such an action could ever include persons who have not
yet become ill. The Court doubted whether any form of notice could
effectively convey the importance of the choice to participate or opt
out of the class to persons who do not yet have the motivation that
disease supplies.80 Moreover, the Court recognized that it is impossi-
ble to give notice to future holders of derivative claims, such as future
spouses who may eventually accrue the right to sue for loss of consor-
tium. 81 Individuals who cannot be given effective notice must be ex-
cluded from the proceeding. The upshot of the holding is that federal
mass trials will be somewhat less likely, and much less comprehensive
in scope, than would have been the case had the decision come down
differently. Nevertheless, the ruling does not bar mass trial proceed-
ings, and mass tort class actions encompassing claims of persons who
currently are injured remain permissible.
3. Limits on State Court Jurisdiction
If emerging caselaw makes global consolidation in the federal
courts more difficult, the option of consolidation in the state courts
77. Compare Eric D. Green, A Post-Georgine Note, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 873 (1997) (stating
that mass tort class actions will not be viable after Amchem) with Linda S. Mullenix, Court Settles
Settlement Class Issue, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 11, 1997, at B12 (stating that the actions will continue to
be viable). See generally Weber, supra note 14 (criticizing approach to class action settlement
taken by Amchem Court, but noting that mass tort class actions are likely to continue to be
brought).
78. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248.
79. Id. at 2249-51.
80. Id. at 2252.
81. Id.
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becomes more appealing. Though Amchem will certainly influence
state courts' interpretations of their own class action rules, states may
ultimately prove more adventurous than federal courts in permitting
innovative groupings of tort claims. Moreover, Article III of the
United States Constitution may present federal courts with difficulties
in adopting some advantageous case-handling techniques, such as
deferral registries and the use of sampling and statistical inference.
State courts, not bound by the same restrictions, have the freedom to
use these mechanisms.82
Limits on territorial jurisdiction may still prevent the full use of
state courts for consolidation of mass torts, however.8 3 For state
courts to reach their potential as magnet forums, the existing trend
towards expansion of state territorial jurisdiction needs to continue. 84
Moreover, state and federal courts that receive later-filed actions that
could be consolidated into an existing consolidation in another state
will need to develop door-closing doctrines, such as forum non con-
veniens and abatement on the ground of prior pending claims, to en-
courage litigants to join the consolidation.85 Interstate compacts or
adoption of the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act would aid these
efforts. 86
CONCLUSION
To the extent that the considerations discussed above counsel
against consolidated trials, limits on legal authority to consolidate are
a good thing, keeping judges from being tempted to package disputes
inappropriately. In my view, consolidation of mass torts in the federal
courts is particularly undesirable. On a balance of efficiencies and
other interests, particularly federalism's protection of states' choices
of underlying legal principles, I prefer consolidated pretrial proceed-
ings in the state courts-either one proceeding or several, depending
on jurisdictional limits-and I believe that some consolidated trials
are appropriate if conducted in the state courts in groupings that rec-
ognize diverse applicable law.
82. See Weber, supra note 36, at 252-53.
83. See id. at 259 (citing, inter alia, Robert W. Kastenmeier & Charles Gardner Geyh, The
Case in Support of Legislation Facilitating the Consolidation of Mass-Accident Litigation: A View
from the Legislature, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 535, 539 (1990)).
84. See id. at 260-61.
85. See id. at 261.
86. See id. at 266-70. Other potential objections to interstate consolidation are raised and
answered in the same source. Id. at 253-74. For a comprehensive discussion of the Uniform
Transfer of Litigation Act, 14 U.L.A. §§ 101-305 (1991), see Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Con-
solidation: A Comparison of the ALl Project with the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 LA.
L. REV. 897 (1994).
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